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Abstract  
Denial of service attacks, distributed denial of service attacks and reflector attacks are well known and 
documented events. More recently these attacks have been directed at game stations and mobile 
communication devices as strategies for disrupting communication. In this paper we ask, How can slow 
DDos attacks be detected? The similarity metric is adopted and applied for potential application.  A short 
review of previous literature on attacks and prevention methodologies is provided and strategies are 
discussed. An innovative attack detection method is introduced and the processes and procedures are 
summarized into an investigation process model. The advantages and benefits of applying the metric 
are demonstrated and the importance of trace back preparation discussed.  
Keywords Slow DDoS, Detection, Mobile Devices, Metrics 
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1 Introduction 
The lower bandwidth of mobile devices has prevented many of the more sophisticated attacks that are 
found on the Internet disrupting services. However, as the global proliferation of mobile device 
continues to expand with handsets and other communication devices, and attackers are finding ways to 
infiltrate. One of the more recent mobile phone attacks has been the slow DDOS attack that carefully 
obscures its tracks by fitting within the bandwidth on a time-based calculation. The attack slowly builds 
up momentum through compromised nodes and can become very costly for a user. These attacks create 
irritation for the end user by disrupting services but these disruptions and delays also create economic 
advantage for the service suppliers. The detection of these attacks requires new measures. In this paper 
we explore with dummy data from a mobile phone attack, the potential of the inter-similarity metric. 
The metric shows that it can quickly aggregate variations in log files over extended periods of time to 
identify patterns and consistencies that can disclose an attacker. The purpose of this is not only to alert 
the event but also to provide evidence in order to trace back to the attacker. 
Cisco in Bailey et al. (2009) reported that smart devices were responsible for generating 14 times more 
traffic than a non-smart device. As a result, the cellular networks have made tremendous improvements 
in order to meet the demands for increased band with and QoS (Anstee et al., 2013). According to Farina 
et al. (2016), the 4G connections is responsible for generating six times more traffic than non 4G 
connections in 2015. However, globally, mobile data traffic reached 3.7 Exabyte per month in 2015; 
making mobile data traffic grow 4,000-fold over the past 10 years and almost 400-million-fold over the 
past 15 years. Smart devices represented 36 percent of mobile device connections globally in 2015. This 
accounted for 89 percent of mobile data traffic in which 55 percent was mobile video traffic. The average 
smartphone usage grew 43 percent in 2015. It is unambiguous in the literature that the cellular network 
will be the backbone that provides connectivity to a large amount of connected devices with various 
capabilities. It has ultra-high reliability but also a growing number of vulnerabilities (Chen & Song, 
2005). Increasing demand from network users’ for pervasive connectivity generates a demand for 
dynamic mobile networking. This also drives the growth in the development and usage of various mobile 
and wireless applications such as audio/video conferencing, distance learning, e-commerce, and 
distributed and multiparty games (Fernand et al., 2007). It has also led into an integration of various 
service infrastructures in order to provide all these services to users. As a result, cellular technologies 
will be the backbone to create connectivity to various devices and applications requirements. The wide 
variety of requirements carry new challenges to the cellular networks. Creating an architecture that can 
comprise performance, flexible functionality and security for the future connected industries is a 
challenge (Chen & Song, 2005). The characterization reveal by Network Science regarding the Cellular 
network and public switched telephone network: Relative Maturity is ranked High; Technology Intensity 
also ranked High; Societal Impacts/Benefits is ranked High and Societal Impact of Catastrophic Failure 
is ranked high as well (Deka et al., 2015). 
For that reason, researchers in the field have been studying and developing various techniques to protect 
and prevent attacks on such network infrastructure (Arun et al., 2013). Real world systems can be 
represented by complex networks such as, social networks, communication networks, biological 
networks (Goodrich, 2008), (Gulisano et al., 2015), technological, transportation (Guo & Lee, 2010) and 
sociological (Guliisano et al., 2015). There structural complexity, and network evolution due to 
technological changes and connection diversity, are complex (Hendiks et al., 2014). A Complex network 
is defined as a large collection of interconnected nodes, where anything can be a node. For instance a 
person, an organization, a computer, a biological cell, and so forth. When Interconnected then two 
people know each other or two computers have a link connecting them for the purpose of passing 
information. These systems are considered complex because they are large and impossible to 
understand or predict their behavior. Due to the complex nature of these systems/networks, graph 
theory provides visualisation for the combination of switches and links that form a communication 
network (Hazeyama et al., 2003). This work focusses on assessing the vulnerabilities of the cellular 
communication network structure to a random or intentional attack; which can trigger the process of 
cascading failures. The criticality application of the similarity metric exploits the availability of log files 
and the relative spatial discrepancies between traffic expectations and abnormalities.    
2 Previous Literature 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) is a type of Denial of Service (DOS) attack where an attacker 
infected a large number of systems with malicious software to gain control. The attacker then utilized 
those compromised systems to launch an attack on the targeted system (Robinson and Thomas, 2012, 
p.713). The purpose of DoS/DDoS is to flood the target system or service with a large number of requests. 
Australasian Conference on Information Systems  Cusack, Lutui, Khaleghparast 
2016, Wollongong  Attacks on Mobile Devices 
  3 
This will eventually force it to shut down, in this manner, denying access to legitimate users (Chen and 
Song, 2005, p.526). Successful DDoS attack achieves two objectives, overpowering the victim’s system 
and concealing the attacker’s identity. Therefore, it is vital to monitor the characteristics of DDoS, as 
early detection of any variance to the system’s normal activities can significantly increase the chance of 
preventing it and prioritizing them more accurately. The  three components that researchers in the field 
are currently working on our detection, tracing back the origin of an attack, and preventing/defending 
(Robinson and Thomas, 2012, p.713). 
The DDoS technique is very hard to detect and identify because it can be launched from hundreds or 
thousands of compromised nodes over the Internet. In this nature of attack, it also makes it hard to 
distinguish between legitimate network traffic and DDoS attack traffic. However, the vast variety of 
attacks in cyberspace indicate that the problem area is also vast and may very well be hard to conduct 
an exploratory study (Mirkovic and Reiher, 2004, p.39). DDoS has been further developed into a new 
type of DoS known as Low-rate DDoS. With this type of DDoS, attackers can now launch an attack using 
mobile SMART devices such as SMART phones. Last known report of this type of attack was reported 
by Murdock (2015) which involved 650,000 SMART phones. In the body of knowledge it is evident that 
there have been studies in this field trying to enhance the detection, mitigation and trace back 
mechanisms (Yu, 2014c, p.31). It is also evident that this type of cyber-attack is a major and continuous 
threat in cybersecurity (Yu, 2014b, p.1).  
In the literature reviewed for this paper, it is evident that the main problem with DoS and DDoS attacks 
is the fact that, they are hard to detect, prevent/defend and trace back to the origin. The new generation 
of mobile communication has meant that we are now having mobile access to the wealth of information 
and services. Even though that its benefit is acknowledged but, a concerned is noted due to the 
proliferation of mobile technologies available (Serra and Venter, 2011, p.2). The advancement in the 
functionalities of technologies such as web-servers and cellular networks has enabled various 
applications to interact with each other. The advancement has also opened new opportunities in terms 
of security threats. For instance, attacks on mobile devices and cellular networks (Meyer and Penzhorn, 
2004, p.20). Security researchers’ stated that Smart devices now represent a particular risk. They 
function like computers, provide Internet connectivity from anywhere at any time and they can 
download applications or files, some could carry malicious code. Security experts are finding a growing 
number of viruses, worms and Trojan horses that target mobile devices. Security researchers argued 
that before long, hackers could infect mobile devices with malicious software (Leavitt, 2005, p.20).    
Over the past decade, mobile devices have always been a victim of an attack such as data exfiltration as 
mobile devices contains large amount of probative information that can be linked to an individual 
(Kasiaras, et al., 2014, p.157). Today, processing and computational power of mobile devices is similar 
to that of a desktop computer and its potential to carry out offensive attacks on computer systems and 
services is certainly possible (Farina, et al., 2016, p.281). It is evident in the current literature that the 
usage of mobile devices is still increasing. As a result, they can constitute a target attack but are also an 
effective tool for launching distributed attacks such as a mobile botnet one (Farina, et al., 2014, p.385). 
Detection, prevention and trace back are the three main areas of DDoS that researchers are focusing on. 
3 DOS/DDOS Topologies 
There are different known network topologies for DoS/DDoS attack. However, the structure employed 
for a particular attack only depends on the attacker’s preference.  
A denial-of-service (DoS) attack is defined as an attempt to make a service such as a server or network 
unavailable to legitimate users by flooding it with attack packets. It’s an attack on availability and there 
are four main DoS attack methods (Panko and Boyle, 2013, p.37). 
Attacker
Victim
Internet
 
Figure 1: DoS topology (adopted from Panko and Boyle, 2013, p.37) 
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First is single source against single target (SSST) and second is and multiple sources against single target 
(MSST) (Xiuzhen, et al., 2011, p.221). The third method is named by Panko and Boyle (2013) as reflected 
and the fourth is sending malformed packets (p.198).   
According to Yu (2014b), there two different types of DDoS attack structure – the typical DDoS attack 
and the Distributed Reflection Denial of Service (DRDoS) attack (p.3). 
bot bot bot
Victim
Command 
& Control
Communication
Traffics
 
Figure 2: Typical DDoS topology (adopted from Yu, 2014b, p.4) 
Figure 2 showed the network topology for a typical DDoS attack. In this environment, the attacker sends 
the command message to the command and control server to activate attack processes on all the bots 
(Yu, 2014b, p.5). The difference between the typical DDoS and the DRDoS is that, in DRDoS attack, the 
bot is control by the command and control centre.   
bot bot bot
Victim
Command 
& Control
Communication
Traffics
reflector reflector reflector
Attack
Traffics
Attack
Traffics
 
Figure 3: DRDoS topology (adopted from Yu, 2014b, p.5) 
The bots send out stream of packets to the reflectors using the victim’s IP address as the source 
address in the packet’s header. As a result, the reflectors will flood the victim’s system with 
respond traffics to what they believe a legitimate requests coming from the victim.      
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Master
Handlers
Agents
Victim
 
Figure 4: Constituents of DDoS (adopted from Deshmukh and Devadkar, 2015, p.204)  
This architecture takes advantage of the client server technology. The Master forms the botnet by using 
the agents or bots and this known as the Zombies. The Master communicates with the Zombies via the 
Handlers. For instance, the Master sends out control commands to the Zombies via the Handlers (Singh, 
et al., 2016, p.112). Zombies are the nodes that are compromised by the Handlers, An attacker can 
compromise systems by scanning for vulnerabilities in the system. There are a number scanning 
techniques that an attacker can use such as Uniform scan worms, Hit list worm or the Routing worm 
(Zou, et al., 2006, p.702). Due to the rapid development in communication technologies, smart devices 
now can access the Internet via various wireless technologies such as Wi-FI, 3G, LTE or WiMax etc 
(Farina, et al., 2014, p.385). As a result, hackers can see the capabilities of engaging these devices in 
criminal activities. In the case of engaging these devices in a DDoS attack, specific malicious software 
such as worm or spyware is developed as means of creating a botnets to perform an attack (DDoS) attack 
(Stafford and Urbaczewski, 2004, p.297). 
The network architecture in figure 5 showed that the attacker can use Wi-Fi network to create a botnet 
and launch an attack using the cellular network.  
Attacker
Agents
Victim
Edge router
Internet Router
HandlersSmart 
Devices
Smart 
Phone
Smart 
Phone
Smart 
Phone
Smart 
Phone
Smart 
Phone
 
Figure 5: Mobile device DDoS topology (adopted from Hadiks, et al., 2014, p.507) 
4 Proposed Method for Detection & Traceback 
There have been known security incidents of DDoS involving Mobile devices. For instance, September 
2015, researchers from CloudFlare reported that a DDoS attack peaked at over 275,000 HTTP requests 
per second and resulted in 4.5 billion hits on the targeted website. This was blamed on a malicious 
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advertising that compromised up to 650,000 Smartphones (Murdock, 2015, p.1). Various entities come 
together to create a cellular network and are grouped together based on their functions and interface 
requirements. As a result, these are divided into four main components: The Mobile Station (MS), The 
Base Station Subsystem (BSS), The Network and Switching Subsystem (NSS) and The Operation and 
Support Subsystem (OSS) (Androulidakis and Basios, 2008, p.465).  
The vision of the 3G technologies is to use the IP technologies for control and transport. This cross 
network service collaborations will introduce a multi-vendor, multi-domain environment in order to 
gratify a wide variety of needs. This relationship will need to use Internet-based data and data from the 
cellular network in order to provide services to wireless users (Kotapati, et al., 2005, p.631). This new 
venture between these two different technologies introduces new vulnerabilities and exposes the users 
on the cellular network to a range of additional risks such as the DoS/DDoS attacks (Ricciato, et al., 
2010, p.553).The introduction and growth of usages of technologies such as 4G/LTE and its high 
bandwidth has increased the pervasiveness nature of access points to the network. It is therefore evident 
mobile devices constitute not only a new target of an attack but its capability to execute an attack (Farina, 
et al., 2016, p.269). Contact list stored on mobile devices can be used to spread the malware and infect 
other devices (Plohmann, et al., 2011, p.133). A DoS/DDoS attack has evolved from flood to low 
bandwidth rate based also known as Slow DoS, Low-Rate DoS, Low Bandwidth Rate (LBR) DoS or 
application DoS. The purpose of this Slow DoS technique is to lower the amount of bandwidth and 
resources that are required to execute an attack. This new technique has been adopted and used in 
devices such as mobile phone (Cambiaso, et al., 2012, p.195). While most of the packets send to the 
target node in a flooding DoS attack may be useless but, in a low-rate attack, almost all of the packets 
play a role in the success of the attack. Therefore, the low-rate DoS will force the victim to process only 
the attack packets. There is not yet an effective taxonomy to address an efficient detection method in 
relation to slow-rate DoS (Cambiaso, et al., 2012, p.197). In this paper, the focus is on a technique to 
detect this kind of attack on mobile devices and also the use of digital forensics method to trace back the 
attack to its origin. 
4.1 Distance Based Similarity Metric for Detection of Low-Rate DDoS Attack 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is simple but a very powerful technique of attack (Douligeris and 
Mitrokotsa, 2004, p.643). The recent rapid development of mobile technologies has also led to a growth 
in their level of penetration. This growth also leads to a development of particular worms and other 
malicious software (Stafford and Urbaczewski, 2004, p.292). All these new advancements also led to a 
new type of DoS attack known as Low-rate DoS/DDoS attacks (Kuzmanovic and Knightly, 2003, p.75). 
Low-rate DDoS sends attack traffic periodically to the target device which is completely different from 
the traditional flooding DoS attack (Wu, et al., 2011, p.189). Various techniques for detection of the 
traditional flooding DDoS has been discussed in the literature. This section is designed to discuss and 
propose the use of the distance based similarity metric to detect a Low-rate DDoS attack. This metric 
has been used by Rasmi and Jantan (2013) and who propose a new algorithm known as Similarity of 
Attack Intentions (SAI) to estimate the similarity of cybercrime intentions for network forensics (p.542). 
Another study found that using self-similarity algorithm to detect DDoS can be difficult but it is possible 
(Brignoli, 2008, p.92).  
Similarity has been used as the method for link predictions. For instance, x and y is assigned a score Sxy 
which can be defined as proximity or similarity between x and y (Lü and Zhou, 2011, p.153). The 
Similarity metric can be used in a more skilled approach such as using the node’s attributes to define 
their similarity (Lin, 1998, p.298). Similarity has been used also to evaluate distances between nodes. 
The shorter the path between nodes, the more similar they are (Resnik, 1995, p.448). Distance based 
similarity metric is employed in this study to evaluate the similarity of the previous log file against the 
current log file in order to determine if a DDoS attack has occurred. Bajcsy and Kovačič (1989) argued 
that defining the problem will be the best way to fully understand the nature of the problem and what 
to match, i.e., what are the features to be used in matching; what are the constraints we have to consider; 
how to match, i.e., the matching process for achieving a consistent match; how to evaluate the match, 
i.e., define the similarity measure (p.3).  
Protocols HTTP, HTTPS, ICMP, TCP, UDP, SYN, IRC 
Attributes Time interval 
Table 1. Characteristics of Low-rate DDoS. 
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To evaluate the similarity between two different objects x and y, a distance metric known as Euclidean 
Distance (EU) is used, which defines as follow:  
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 (𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) =  �(𝑥𝑥 −  𝑦𝑦)2            (1) 
This metric can also be generalized into n-dimensions points, such that a={x1, x2, … xn} and b={y1, y2, …, 
yn}. In this case, n-dimensions EU metric is defined as: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 (𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏) =  �(𝑥𝑥1 −  𝑦𝑦1)2 +  (𝑥𝑥2 −  𝑦𝑦2)2 + ⋯+ (𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 −  𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛)2 
= �� (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖)2
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1                                   (2) 
Let L1 and L2 be the existing log file and the current log file, respectively. Let xi represent each protocol 
used in the existing log and yi represent the protocol used in the current log, where i={1, 2, …, n} and n 
is the total number of protocols as shown in table 1. In this case, L1 ={x1, x2, …, xn} and L2 ={y1, y2, …, yn}.  
Euclidean distance can be normalized into a distance based similarity as follow: 
𝑆𝑆 = 1
1+𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐿𝐿1,𝐿𝐿2)
                                   (3) 
Similarity normalized EU into a value in between 0 and 1, where a value of 1 means that the two objects 
are identical and a value other than 1 means that the two objects are not identical.This study focuses on 
detecting the DDoS attack and identifying the means of the attack. Various protocols can be engaged in 
an attack such as it showed in table 1. In order to detect an attack, the similarity between the existing 
and the current log files are ranked. In doing so, the Euclidean distance between L1 and L2 is calculated 
first by using equation (1) and then the similarity can be ranked based on equation (3). Table 2, shows a 
simple case of calculating the distance based similarity of various protocols that were used in an attack. 
The sample data was taken from a live attack and then processed. Once the attack has been detected, the 
protocol that was engaged in the attack needs to be identified. When the detection processes are 
completed, a detailed report is developed for forensics. Table 2 illustrates the processes of distance based 
similarity.  
4.2 Traceback Using Mobile Forensic Techniques 
Mobile phone forensics is described as the science of recovering digital evidence from a mobile phone 
under forensically sound conditions using accepted methods (Curran, et al., 2010, p.1; Jansen and Ayers, 
2007, p.4). Various digital forensics methods have been proposed by researchers around the world as a 
technique to trace back DDoS attackers. For instance, “attack pattern” is a technique that can be used to 
specify a generic way of performing an attack (Fernandez, et al., 2007, p.346).  Guo and Lee (2010) 
proposed the use of Network forensics analysis method which relies wholly on the analysis of the IDS 
log files (p.294) Guo and Simon (2010) proposed an analytical model focusing on the analysis phase of 
network forensics procedure. This model will help forensic investigators in looking for patterns to 
determine if there is an anomaly in the traffic as result of an address spoofing flooding (ASF) attack. If 
there is an ASF attack, the model will also help to determine the time of when the attack was launched 
(p.135). 
Kim and Kim (2011) proposed a Network Forensic Evidence Acquisition (NFEA) scheme with packet 
marking that offers an effective tracking scheme that can help network forensics investigators to trace 
back a DDoS attack to its origin. NFEA can guarantee the admissibility of the evidence acquired from 
the edge routers (p.392). Huang and Huang (2013) also adopted the network forensics method to 
investigate DDoS attack proposed Map (GHSOM) to look for variance in patterns of network traffic data 
(p.536). It is evident in the literature that there is yet much to understand with regards to the use of 
mobile forensics methods in the tracing back of DDoS attacks on mobile devices. The proposed trace 
 
Protocol
s HTTP HTTPS ICMP TCP UDP SYN IRC 
L1 x1=1000 x2=800 x3=600 x4=2000 x5=5000 x6=6000 x7=200 
L2 y1=21000 y2=1000 y3=600 y4=3000 y5=7000 y6=1000 y7=500 
EU(L1, L2) 20000 200 0 1000 2000 5000 300 
S 0.00005 0.004 1 0.001 0.0005 0.0002 0.03 
Table 2.  A simple case of distance based similarity ranking. 
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back method is based on the life cycle of the bot as shown in figure 7 (Silva, et al., 2013, p.381). The 
Initial Infection is the first phase where the device can be infected in several various ways. Provided that 
the first phase was successfully executed, the second phase is a secondary injection where the 
compromised device executes a program for malware binaries in a given network database (Silva, et al., 
2013, p.384). 
Phase 1
Initial Injection
Phase 2
Secondary Injection
Phase 3
Connection or Rally
Phase 4
Malicious Activities
Phase 5
Maintenance & 
Upgrading  
Figure 7: the Botnet’s life cycle (adopted from Silva, et al., 2013, p.383) 
The Malicious Activities phase allows the bots to communicate with the controller for instructions for 
conducting activities such as such as spam, DDoS and scanning. The final phase is the Maintenance and 
Upgrade. The bots continuously upgrades for various reasons such as, updating its codes to include 
avoids detection or to add new features (Zhu, Z., et al., 2008, p.967). Our proposed method is shown in 
figure 8, and the investigator methodology in figure 9. It is designed to take advantage of the botnet’s 
life cycle and to use the attacker’s own strategy against the attacker (Mulliner and Seifert, 2010, p.76). 
A malware will be placed in one or more of the bots in the botnet. When the attacker is returned to 
maintain and upgrade the bots, the malware can replicate itself to the attacker’s device and it will reveal 
the attacker’s location when the device is online (Polla, et al., 2013, p.448). Recently, hackers started 
attacking mobile devices with various strategies and malware such as Botnets, Backdoors, Rootkits and 
Trojans (Hsieh, et al., 2015, p.136). Symantec reported 2015 that in 2012, the main focus of mobile threat 
is information theft. 2013 was spying on users by tracking GPS coordinates and recording calls etc. 2014 
the focus was on stealing device data and spying on the users (Symantec, 2015, p.22; Mell, et al., 2007, 
p.15). In terms of mobile devices, communication is the most important part of mobile botnet attack. 
Mobile devices have limited resources such as battery, network bandwidth, etc (Mulliner and Seifert, 
2010, p.76).     
Victim
Low-Rate 
DDoS Packets
Command & 
Control Packets
Botnet
Command & 
Control 
Trace Back Packets Low-rate attack packets
Persistent tracking cookies  
Figure 8 CtC trace back & investigation method. 
 
Mobile forensics is defined as the science of recovering digital evidences from a mobile device under 
forensically sound conditions using accepted methods (Mumba and Venter, 2014, p.4). Mobile forensics 
investigation process consists of 15 phases however, it is divided into three main processes. The 
initialization process, the acquisition processes and the investigative processes. (Omeleze and Venter, 
2013, p.5). The investigative processes consists of six processes.  The Potential digital evidence 
acquisition, digital evidence examination and analysis, digital evidence interpretation, reporting, 
presentation and investigation closure (Mumba and Venter, 2014, p.4). The processes employed in this 
study only concern the examination and analysis phase as illustrated in figure 9. The results will be used 
by the CtC method to trace back the location of the attacker. These processes were designed not only to 
eliminate the irrelevant data but assure the admissibility of the evidence in the court of law. The mobile 
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forensics analysis process as illustrated in figure 9 starts with the data acquired from the victim’s device. 
The data is used together with the reports from the similarity distance detection metric they can be 
calculated as a continuous process or on previous log data. 
Identify similarity 
results from the 
image dataImage from mobile 
device
Report from 
similarity detection
Similarity in 
the data NO
YES
StorageAnalyse packet 
headers according to 
similarity results
Extract source IP 
addreses
Further analysis & 
start reconstructing 
the attack path
Found 
evidence?
NO
YES
Prepare reportEND
START
 
  
Figure 9: Mobile Low-rate DDoS forensics investigation process 
5 Discussion 
 
The foremost objective of mobile forensics method is to produce credible evidence of a crime committed 
that can be used to prosecute perpetrator. In this paper, the distance based similarity metric is applied 
to detect an attack from a slow DoS/DDoS onto a mobile device. The metric is also used to identify the 
nature of the attack for instance, which layer of the OSI model was the attack based on. The dummy data 
that we put through the metric to test the performance clearly showed when and where the slow DDOS 
attack occurred. Murdock (2015) reported that 650,000 SMART phones in China were compromised to 
launch an application layer DDoS attack. This attack generated 4.5 billion hits on the target (p.1). The 
detection feature of the metric as explained in section 4.1 will run a comparison of the current log against 
the benchmark log. When such an attack is detected then a closer look will be taken to identify the nature 
of the attack as illustrated in figure 7. Once the attack is confirmed and the nature of the attack is 
identified which in the above example is HTTP, a report is developed for forensics to start the 
investigation and the trace back process. 
In the simple case shown in table 2, L1 shows the total requests from each protocol on the existing log. 
L2 shows the total requests from each protocol on the current log. EU(L1, L2) showed the results for 
each protocol when Euclidean distance is used to evaluate L1 and L2. S shows the results from EU(L1, 
L2) for each protocol after they have been normalized by similarity into a value in between 0 and 1.  It is 
evident in the simple case showed and computed in table 2, that distance based similarity effectively 
improved the processes of detection, identification and investigation. This is due to the fact that the 
metric can identify the nature of the attack. Forensics will acquire the data, examine and analyze only 
the protocol(s) identified by the metric and start the attack path reconstruction process. Figure 9 is a 
unique contribution that is designed to facilitate investigation processes. The flow diagram optimises 
the use of information to guide a digital investigator through the use of the similarity metric. The 
processes also assure forensically sound actions are taken and in a logical sequence that can be 
reproduced and presented for a court of law. 
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The application and computation of the similarity metric demonstrates its applicability to slow DDOS 
attack detection. It provides an answer to the question of how can slow DDOS attacks be detected?; And 
also opens further research into the applicability of this metric in diverse situations and under different 
loadings. The potential is to automate the detection system based on live data and also for historical 
data. As such the metric has value for both security and forensic activity around mobile phones. The 
concept of disrupting mobile phone usage impacts the economic value and the social value of these 
devices. DDOS attacks provide economic value to the service providers because the owners of the mobile 
devices are locked into feepaying contracts of different descriptions. It is their phones and 
communication systems are exploited and they are liable for the costs. However, ebusinesses can be 
adversely affected when customers cannot get to their business opportunity or frustration levels reach a 
point where the customer’s speak poorly of a particular service supplier. Similarly the disruption of 
emergency services and other critical resources can result. The detection and disruption of this type of 
attack is critical for the maintenance of confidence in mobile communication systems. 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper, distance based similarity metric is proposed as the method for detection and identification 
of slow DoS/DDoS attacks. The Euclidean distance metric was used to evaluate the similarity between 
the current and the benchmark logs. The distance based similarity metric was then used to normalize 
the evaluation results into a value in the range of 0 and 1. The result from the simple case developed to 
validate the method showed that the distance based similarity metric clearly detects and identify the 
attack and its nature. It is also evident in this study that the metric also effectively improved the 
performance, effectiveness and efficiency of the examination and analysis processes of the mobile 
forensics investigation. For future work, a general algorithm for detection and identification of such an 
attack under different conditions is being developed based on the distance based similarity metric. This 
will be used on a larger DDoS dataset to further evaluate the algorithm for accuracy and reliability. 
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